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Nepal is a country with a brutal history of endemic domestic conflict and 
economic inequality. With the majority of the population living below the 
poverty line, development discourse has been crucial to political discussions for 
the past 20 years. The advent of the People‘s War marked a highly significant 
turn in the history of Nepali politics as the formation of the United Communist 
Party of Nepal (CPN-M) and the subsequent insurgency that followed brought 
issues of socio-economic equality and empowerment of marginalized peoples to 
the forefront of the national agenda. The CPN-M rapidly gained support 
predominantly in the rural countryside and carried out a violent protracted 
People‘s War in order bring about economic transformation. However, there has 
been very little socio-economic change since the Maoists gained the majority of 
seats in the Constituent Assembly despite promises of equality and improved 
livelihoods throughout the bloody years of the war. This research seeks to 
demonstrate how the Maoists were able to mobilize the masses and gain political 
support through the strategic use of development as an incentive for joining the 
rebellion. After having studied much of the Maoist literature published at the time 
of the People‘s War as well as having spoken with several noteworthy Nepali 
academics, I have provided an in depth analysis of the relationship between the 
CPN-M and development over time. The research ultimately paints a clear 
picture of two distinct dichotomies resulting from Maoist political activities in 
Nepal: between development and destruction and growth and decline. Although 
the Maoists have continually made promises to further develop Nepal and bring 
the country into a state of stability and economic prosperity, the social structure 
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of Nepal remains unchanged and underdeveloped. This research presents an 
alternative theory for the tactics used by the Maoists to gain political support and 
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The Nepalese society at the beginning of the 21
st
 century is passing 
through the greatest upheavals in its entire history in the form of the 
revolutionary People‘s War of the oppressed classes, regions, 
nationalities, gender and communities against the outmoded semi-feudal 
and semi-colonial social order (Dr. Baburam Bhattarai 2003). 
 
Nepal—consistently ranked amongst the poorest and least developed 
countries in the world—has been brutally scarred by a political history wrought 
with violence, corruption and conflict. The political events of the past 20 years 
are of particular significance to the current deadlock persisting within the 
Constituent Assembly and to the future of development in Nepal. The present 
situation is such that thousands of development organizations have carved out a 
political and economic niche for themselves while the Communist Party of 
Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) has struggled to recover from the detrimental effects of 
the People‘s War by legitimizing themselves within the political framework of 
the Nepali government. However, despite the ceasing of gunfire in the early years 
of the 21
st
 century, Nepal continues to real under abject poverty, political 
stalemate, weak economic conditions and widespread, rampant 
underdevelopment.  
 The People‘s War, initiated by the CPN-M in 1996 ultimately laid the 
foundation for the immediate future of Nepali politics. Nepal continues to be one 
of the poorest countries in the world with 55 percent of the population falling 
below the international poverty line of $1.25 US dollars a day (USAID 2010). A 
victim of natural disasters, food shortage and poverty, development in Nepal is a 
both a necessity and a topic of much debate. Additionally, with no legitimate 
government to speak of, and a Maoist majority in the Constituent Assembly 
preventing any legislation from being carried out, we must look to the past for 
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understanding, explanation and to determine a connection between development 
in Nepal and the CPN-M. Several questions must be raised including: Why is 
there a Maoist majority in the Constituent Assembly? How were the Maoists able 
to gain support during the preliminary stages of their political formation? How 
were they able to mobilize the masses ultimately resulting in a violent insurgency 
and integration within mainstream Nepali politics? Will the Maoists develop 
Nepal? All of these questions are important for contextualizing both the 
importance of development in Nepal and the power of the Maoists within the 
current political situation.  
 The intention of this paper is to demonstrate that since the formal 
inception of the CPN-M political party in 1995, the Maoists have used 
development as an effective power tool. Promises of elevated livelihoods, 
improved living conditions, and self-reliant development for all of Nepal were 
political strategies employed by the Maoists in the preliminary and ensuing years 
of the People‘s War for the purposes of mobilizing the masses and co-opting rural 
peoples, gaining support and ultimately obtaining political power. In other words, 
I argue that the proclamations of development made by the Maoists were ulterior 
motives and means for gaining power during the late 20
th
 and early 21
st
 centuries. 
As we can observe from the current political situation in which the Maoists form 
the majority of the legislative body, this particular strategy has proven successful. 
Given these conditions, the interactions between the CPN-Maoists and foreign 
development agencies are of increasing significance to the current economic and 
political situation of Nepal which warrants an examination of the past 






In order to properly carry out this research and do justice to the proposed 
topic, it was imperative that I spend ample time familiarizing myself with the 
historical trajectory of the Maoist movement by reading publications written by 
and about the Maoists from the past 15 years. In doing so, I was able to determine 
biases and recognize false promises or exaggerations. Additionally, by looking at 
several economic growth charts, I was able to further understand the accuracy of 
many statements and see the reality of many situations. I supplemented my 
extensive book research with 4 semi-structured detailed interviews with 
noteworthy Nepali academics and one interview with a Maoist leader. This was 
both fundamental to my research findings, and also a potential factor that may 
have altered or limited my findings. By only interviewing scholars, I did not 
necessarily get the opinions and perspectives of those populations who were 
either recruited to the Maoist cause or were directly affected (either socially or 
financially) by the Maoist insurgency. Speaking with laypeople would have 
added a different dimension to this research and possibly resulted in a different 
outcome. However, due to issues of practicality, this was not possible as many of 
these people live in the Western most regions of Nepal. Also, after speaking with 
several academics, it became clear that I needed to keep consistent with the type 
of people I was interviewing, or radically change the methodology of my 
research.  
Each interview was semi-structured in that I had prepared a list of fixed 
questions which were open-ended and meant to prompt discussion. The 
interviews consisted of a back and forth dialogue between me and the participant. 
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All interview participants were made to sign a full and informed consent form 
and were given the option of speaking anonymously or off the record. I recorded 
the first 3 interviews, but then decided to play a more participatory role in the 
interviews by conversing more and taking more hand written notes. Due to the 
sensitive nature of this topic, I had expected to encounter some hesitation 
particularly in my interview with Maoist leader as I figured they would not want 
to have their interview included in the research paper. However, Maoist leader, 
Kul Prasad KC was more than complacent and happy to offer insight and opinion 
on all of my questions. 
My research was ultimately limited by the fact that I was only able to 
interview one Maoist leader. Gaining the Maoist perspective through literature 
and through discussion are two very different experiences which I believe would 
have been very complimentary to each other had I been given the opportunity to 
interview more members of the CPN-M. It proved a very difficult feat to get in 
touch with individuals who were knowledgeable about this topic, residing in 
Nepal and willing to meet with me. For these reasons, I was only able to 
complete 5 extensive interviews. Additionally, I was unable to meet with anyone 
representing a development agency, but not for lack of trying. I repeatedly 
contacted several development agencies including USAID, DFID, and the Swiss 
Agency for International Development, but was never actually able to meet with 
an individual. I would have loved to have more of a development perspective as it 
would have contributed greatly to several sections of this paper. Time was also a 
limiting factor for this research. One month was hardly enough time to complete 
and in depth analysis of the Maoists and development. Many people I had 
originally wanted to interview were out of the country and perhaps if I had more 
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time, I would have been able to arrange a visit to several districts with a strong 
Maoist presence. Overall, my methodology was very simple as it mainly 
consisted of desk research. The following sections represent my findings and 
analysis of the information I was able to retrieve during the research period using 
the above stated methods. 
Research Findings 
Defining Development: 
How to Understand Development in the Context of Nepal 
 
Development in Nepal has been encouraged by the presence of many of 
foreign aid donors and thousands of do-good nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) that have made a permanent niche for themselves in the context of 
improving the livelihoods of the Nepali people and in so doing, promoting a path 
towards modernity. According to data from the Social Welfare Commission, 
updated as recently as August of this year, there are currently 191 international 
nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) and 21,285 NGOs registered with the 
Commission—not including the presence of established branches of foreign aid 
ministries from various Western countries such as the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and the Department for International 
Development (DFID) from the U.K. (Social Welfare Council Data 2010). Given 
the sheer volume of development efforts in Nepal, it becomes necessary to draw 
upon a wide array of various definitions and theories in order to reach a common 
understanding of how development is to be understood for the purposes of this 
paper and in the context of Nepal. 
Development—a word that bears endless connotations, implications and 
definitions is also a word that stimulates the intellectual mind and frustrates the 
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common optimist. It can be defined as a goal and primary concern of Western 
nations and transnational organizations—a ―white man‘s burden‖ of sorts or the 
―transformation of the poor into the assisted‖ (Escobar 1995). We can understand 
it as an industry in which individuals make a profit by spearheading 
entrepreneurial endeavors and as a sector that employs a vast number of 
professionals and volunteers. Development can be a process associated with 
growth and change by which Western powers alter, contribute to and/or involve 
themselves in the livelihoods of Third World populations. Some say the concept 
of development dates back to antiquity when Aristotle said, ―We begin at the 
beginning and consider things in the process of their growth (Huntington 1971).‖ 
As modernization theory would have it, development can be understood as a 
process of growth whereby societies are transformed simply from traditional to 
modern (Huntington 1971). This theory, an incarnation of post-WWII 
development activities, has created a standard by which to measure development 
in ―The Third World‖—standards in accordance with Western values. The 
dichotomy that modernization theory thus insinuates—that between the 
traditional and the modern—is just one of the many foundations used to 
understand the concept of development.   
Many of the previously stated modes of approaching development often 
result in the ―infantilization‖ of the Third World (Escobar 1995) and make it 
nearly impossible to reach a standard definition that encompasses all of these 
implied meanings. Thus, many people are often left confused, befuddled and 
disillusioned with the development process. Therefore, for the purpose of 
understanding this paper in a coherent manner and within the necessary context 
of CPN-Maoist ideology, a definition written by prominent Maoist leader Dr. 
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Baburam Bhattarai will be used. Bhattarai divides development theory into two 
camps: the Anglo-Saxon scholarship camp of the Neo-Classicists and the Marxist 
scholarship camp based on historical materialism. The Neo-Classicist camp 
includes the preceding definitions and theories and ―defines development more in 
terms of economic growth, or as amorphous modernization and views 
underdevelopment as its opposite, in terms of lack of economic growth or as an 
original state of backwardness‖ (Bhattarai 2003).  This definition easily 
insinuates a colonial perspective in which the world is divided into ―civilized‖ 
and ―uncivilized‖ thus emphasizing the existence of a preexisting and limited 
development model used by experts and professionals to categorize the Third 
World (Escobar 1995). The Marxist definition of development, in line with 
Maoist ideology and used by Dr. Bhattarai for his own personal research, 
―regards development as a cumulative process of progressive transformation of 
society to higher formations and sees underdevelopment as the concomitant 
process of blockage to such transformation or distorted structuration primarily 
articulated through retrograde internal and external class configurations‖ 
(Bhattarai 2003). Development in this way can be simply interpreted to mean the 
positive transformation or elevation of society often associated with 
underdevelopment which is the process of being obstructed from doing so by 
means of class polarization or social immobility.  
In discussing development in Nepal, it also becomes important to 
determine how Nepalis view development in Nepal and see how they understand 
themselves within the development framework. Stacey Pigg (1992) uses the 
Nepali word for development, bikas, when speaking on this issue in order to draw 
a unique distinction between the theories and models of development in academia 
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and development meanings particular to Nepalese society. Before continuing to 
the next section, I would like provide a brief quote from Dr. Pigg who has 
conducted numerous studies on development in Nepal that offer insight into the 
Nepali perspective: ―For Nepal, development—rather than the residues and scars 
of imperialism—is the overt link between it and the West. Bikas is the term 
through which Nepalis understand their relationship to other parts of the world‖ 
(Pigg 1992). 
What’s Wrong with Nepal? 
A Maoist Perspective on the Causal Mechanisms of Underdevelopment in 
Nepal 
 
 In order to frame an argument for the Maoist uses of development in the 
preliminary years of the People‘s War, it is first necessary to discuss different 
perspectives and reasons why Nepal has fallen into Bhattarai‘s category of 
underdevelopment and determine several factors that have hindered the 
development process in Nepal. Bhattarai (2003) lays claim to the fact that Nepal 
boasts an extremely unique case of underdevelopment owing to a variety of 
factors which include; absence of direct colonial rule (semi-colonial experience 
through British and Independent India); geographic diversity ranging from the 
tropical terai at an altitude of 100m and the alpine Himalayas serving as the 
tallest point in the world at more than 8800m; land-locked position between two 
economic and political giants, or more commonly referred to as a yam between 
two boulders (India and China); and finally the centuries old feudalistic socio-
political system. These are just some of the contributing factors emphasized by 
Dr. Bhattarai that have affected the ―development of underdevelopment‖ 
(Bhattarai 2003). On a more ideological, Marxian note, Bhattarai (2003) 
attributes underdevelopment in Nepal to the non-development of productive 
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forces, rather than distorted development or development dependent on external 
powers. In other countries victim to the strains of underdevelopment, the core 
issues have rather been the failure to realize the productive potentials of society. 
Another major contributing factor has been the unequal organization of Nepali 
society and the polarization between rich and poor, rural and urban. These two 
issues—that of a low level development of productive forces and high levels of 
economic inequality—are the primary causes of underdevelopment in Nepal, 
according to Maoist literature (Bhattarai 2003).  
 
The Maoist Insurgency: A Very Brief History 
The history of the Maoist presence in Nepal is complex and differs largely 
both in practice and intention during various time periods of great political 
significance.  A highly momentous political change occurred in 1990 which 
included the restoration of democracy and the establishment of a multi-party 
parliamentary system after many years of sudo-democratic monarchical rule. 
Supposedly, the role of the King was reduced to that of a symbolic figurehead. 
However the reality of this situation, emphasized strongly by the Maoists, was 
that the King remained above the law and the monarchy ultimately prevailed 
although behind the guise of an ambiguously worded constitution (Bhattarai 
2002). Prominent Maoist political leader Baburam Bhattarai (2002) explained 
that in the ensuing years, ―the country continued to reel under abject poverty, 
inequality, dependency and all-round underdevelopment. Acute class exploitation 
was accompanied by yet more onerous national, regional, gender and caste 
oppression of the overwhelming majority of the population.‖ The repressive 
political responses of the sudo-democracy further disenfranchised and 
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disillusioned the rural and countryside populations and greatly contributed to the 
growing support for the Maoists (Pettigrew and Shneiderman 2004). This sense 
of frustration enabled the Maoists to mobilize the population by offering 
promises of improvement that the current regime failed to provide (Pettigrew and 
Shneiderman 2004). 
 It was the presence of these conditions that eventually spurred the 
People‘s War initiated by the Maoists (CPN-M) in 1996. In February of that year, 
the Maoists presented a 40 point list of demands to the Nepali Congress. The 
demands ranged from abolishing the monarchy, restoring economic and social 
justice, empowering women and Dalits and establishing a constituent assembly 
(Pettigrew and Shneiderman 2004). When the demands were not met with any 
seriousness, the Maoists went underground and a violent insurgency ensued 
(Pettigrew and Shneiderman 2004). In an interview with prominent Nepali 
scholar Dr. Krishna Bhattachan, Bhattachan explained that the rejection of the 40 
point demands by the Prime Minister at this time was one of the biggest mistakes 
in the political history of Nepal and ultimately prompted the beginning of the 
People‘s War. Within five years, the Maoists succeeded in mobilizing nearly the 
entire countryside of Nepal (Bhattarai 2002). The proceeding years were filled 
with violence, bloodshed and political catastrophe. As C.K. Lal (2001) says, 
―when the gun starts to speak, verbal communication gets silenced‖ a prominent 
theme in Nepali politics for two long decades. 
 
The Maoist Literature and It’s Ties to Development 
The CPN-Maoist party exhibits a strong history of anti-development 
sentiment, especially towards efforts made by foreign powers. Dr. Baburam 
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Bhattarai, a leading ideologue and intellectual of the Maoist movement and 
former Finance Minister for the Nepali government summarized the Maoist 
opinion of foreign intervention in Nepali political matters in his reaction to the 
2003 peace talks by saying, ―most of the rulers of the semi-colonial and 
dependent third world countries are just the puppets in the hands of their foreign 
imperialist masters‖ (Bhattarai 2003). The intensity that this statement espouses 
is likewise highlighted by several other academics. Jason Hart (2003) argues that 
there is a concern on the part of the Maoists that international development 
agencies are simply ―agents of imperialism‖ and a way in which foreign 
governments are able to position themselves within the Nepali political and 
developmental arena. Imperialism appears as a constant theme in this literature 
and in the discussion of the Maoist position on development in Nepal. 
In 2003, the CPN-M drafted a document entitled ―The Minimum Content 
of the New Constitution.‖ Several provisions put forward by the Maoists are 
directly in line with several definitions of development that I have come across 
during this research process. For example, one of the provisions demands that 
education, health and employment be made fundamental rights of the people and 
free universal basic education and health services should be ensured to all (CPN-
M 2003). This is reflective of the Maoist version of development expressed to me 
by Kul Prasad KC, (more commonly referred to as ‗Sonam‘) a politburo member 
and leader of the Young Communist League (YCL), during an interview when he 
defined development as having 4 distinct bases which include Education, Health, 
Housing and Basic Needs/Services (i.e. food, water, etc.). Dr. Janardan Sharma 
of the Sangam Institute defined development as a series of necessary conditions 
including social welfare, education, opportunities, basic services and 
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employment. Additionally, Dev Raj Dahal explained that development must fill 
two conditions: it must set people free and fulfill basic needs. According to these 
definitions as well as those stated in the previous sections of this paper, many of 
the Maoist demands, promises, declarations and publications clearly reflect a 
desire and determination for development in Nepal. 
 In the list of 40 point demands submitted to Prime Minister Sher Bahadur 
Deuba, several demands reflect development potential including the demand for 
gender equality and an end to racial exploitation as well as the abolition of the 
‗untouchability‘ system, the right to education, free healthcare, expression and 
freedom of press, the guarantee of employment and minimum wage and the 
provision of drinking water, roads, and electricity (CPN-M 1996). In the 
interview with Dr. Krishna Bhattachan, he argued that ultimately, because of the 
40 point demands, the insurgency was made possible in two ways. Firstly, the 
Maoists were responsible for bringing these issues of development and inequality 
into the national agenda. They were able to demonstrate the importance and 
necessity of solving these kinds of problems. Secondly, upon receiving the 40 
demands, Prime Minister Deuba outwardly and blatantly rejected them which 
Bhattachan says instigated the onset of the People‘s War. The fact that the 
demands were not met with any seriousness further incited the Maoists to take up 
the arms and formally rebel.  
 
The Strategic Use of Development in the Mobilization of the Masses 
Several arguments have been made that the Maoist uprising itself is a 
direct result of development attempts and activities. Kishor Sharma (2005) claims 
that the failure of development in Nepal along with the corruption of political 
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institutions has created a breeding ground for conflict and civil war. As 
mentioned previously in the works of Seddon and Hussein, development efforts 
in Nepal dramatically failed to improve the livelihood of the nation‘s poor and 
have actually contributed to unemployment, poverty and inequality between the 
rural and the urban (Hussein and Seddon 2002) (Sharma 2005). These factors 
contribute greatly to frustration amongst the disadvantaged populations and 
breeds resentment.  
By the time the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in 
November 2006, the CPN-M had gone from consisting of a few dozen fighters in 
1996 to over 50,000 fighters 10 years later (Eck 2010). How and why was this 
possible? One of the main reasons that the CPN-M had so much success in 
gaining the support of the rural population was that after the democratic change 
of 1990, people were optimistic that they would be involved in the political 
process and it would bring them economic opportunities, equality, and social 
justice (Joshi 2010). However, as I have previously mentioned, the new regime 
failed to address the grievances of the rural peoples and neglected the needs of 
the majority of the population. In their recruitment strategies and in an effort to 
mobilize the countryside, the Maoists highlighted many justifications for their 
war on the Nepali state including the prolonged continuation of social and 
economic inequality, geographic and polarized disparity, poor and corrupt 
governance and repression of the Nepali people by the state (Eck 2010). 
Classical recruitment literature seeks to determine why individuals 
become motivated to join rebellion movements. The discourse addresses the issue 
of whether people are more apt to take part in a rebellion for ―loot-seeking‖ 
reasons or because of their personal grievances (Eck 2010). Other factors that 
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may motivate an individual to join a rebellion movement include geography, 
ethnicity, ideology and religion. Kristine Eck (2010) argues that indoctrination 
and political education were the primary means of successful recruitment by the 
Maoists. ―By linking villagers‘ dissatisfaction with their daily lives to larger 
problems in the political system, the CPN-M was able to exploit grievances for 
the purpose of rebel recruitment‖ (Eck 2010). This theory demonstrates how the 
Maoists were able to expose the poor living conditions and disadvantaged 
livelihoods of the rural populations. Participation in the insurgency became a 
viable option for many as the Maoists offered a means of social change through 
joining the rebellion.  
For example, in 1995, the Maoists initiated a year-long campaign to gain 
the support of the peasant populations of Rolpa, Rukum, and Jajarkot in Western 
Nepal. Political-cultural teams would visit these districts to organize the 
peasantry to challenge local authorities and advocate for infrastructure 
improvement and ultimately gain the political support of these populations (Eck 
2010). Other means of recruitment employed by the CPN-M included mass 
gathering that emphasized the importance of armed struggle and a protracted 
People‘s War for improving the lives of villagers. There gatherings often 
incorporated the use of cultural performances, songs, and poems to win over the 
people to the cause of People‘s War (Eck 2010). Another means of recruitment 
consisted of the use of ―individual motivators‖ who would go door-to-door to 
discuss the grievances of villagers and relate them to the cause of the Maoist 
movement, thus enlisting the support and gaining the trust of many individuals 
(Eck 2010). According to Kristine Eck (2010), these campaigns were highly 
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successful in marketing the Maoist movement to the public by demonstrating the 
potential benefits of joining the movement.  
 
The CPN-M cleverly linked villager‘s grievances about their everyday 
situation with the larger Maoist ideology, attracting recruits by employing 
local idiom. At the same time it ensured that all members were educated 
in Maoist ideology, guaranteeing not only commitment to the cause, but 
also that the diverse individuals which composed the CPN-M were united 
by this ideology (Eck 2010). 
 
Another way in which development can be linked to the recruitment 
strategies of the Maoists is through the informal nature of Nepal‘s economy and 
the social inequality that naturally stems from this. In an interview with 
noteworthy Nepali academic, Dev Raj Dahal from the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 
Foundation Office, Dahal explained to me that the majority of Nepali society and 
economic functions are based on informal systems and relations as 90 percent of 
the economy consists of informal subsistence agriculture. While the informal 
system remains very strong, the formal process has been in a state of deadlock for 
many years. This ultimately means that the state has been unable to bring the 
majority of Nepal into the formal modern economy thus further disenfranchising 
the people and their unequal positions within society. This has forced agriculture 
workers to rely heavily on the informal sector in order earn a meager living. One 
of the ways in which this has manifested itself is through the establishment of 
informal patron-client relationships in the rural areas. Madhav Joshi (2010) 
argues that the existence of oppressive patron-client relationships in the rural 
regions of Nepal further contributed to the grievances of these populations by 
increasing their dependence on local landed elites.  
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 As Dahal mentioned, a vast majority of Nepal‘s population is 
concentrated within subsistence cultivation. Land ownership is a crucial aspect of 
subsistence agriculture and peasant households, but also an expensive and 
difficult thing to obtain. Because of the persistence of social inequality and thus 
inequality in land ownership, many peasant populations were forced to seek the 
assistance and patronage of the local landed elite (Joshi 2010). The elite were 
able to provide the peasants with land and other basic services in exchange for a 
mix of rent, crop shares, free labor and political support by following instructions 
on who to vote for. This forms the basis of a patron-client relationship in which 
the bond is kept strong because the loss of a patron would ―cast peasants into the 
pool of landless laborers, devoid of any subsistence securities and exposed to 
market uncertainties for land, labor and food‖ (Joshi 2010). Now, how do the 
Maoists tie in? As mentioned previously, the 1990 political shift to democracy 
brought no changes to land ownership reforms and social welfare programs, even 
though these were promises made in the election manifestos of several political 
parties. As can be imagined, the rural populations involved in clientelistic 
relationships became further disenfranchised with the political process as they 
were in a vulnerable position and unable to enact any kind of progressive change 
through the democratic process (Joshi 2010). The autonomy of peasant political 
behavior was severely limited and in this way, Joshi (2010) suggests that the 
Maoists were able to play upon their grievances and propose armed insurgency as 
―a means to realize people‘s expectations.‖ Landlords and local elites became 
quick and easy targets of the Maoist insurgency because they were able to both 
challenge the feudal state and reduce the costs for the peasants to join the 
insurgency (Joshi 2010). The clientelistic bonds were destroyed and the local 
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elites were driven out—replaced by the Maoists who offered promises of land 
security and debt relief. ―The CPN-M made it extremely clear that should they 
come to power, the peasantry would have access to a multitude of political, 
economic and social goods currently unavailable to them. Such promises may 
have outweighed the risks of joining particularly when so many had so little to 
lose‖ (Eck 2010).  
Moving forward several years to the Constituent Assembly elections of 
2006 in which the Maoists gained an overwhelming majority of the Assembly, 
we must look at the reasons behind their victory after 10 years of brutal war. 
When observing the details of the election patterns, it is clear that the majority of 
the population voted for the social, economic and political change that the 
Maoists promised to bring upon their electoral win. Mahendra Lawoti (2010) 
argues that this is because the Maoists not only gained the majority of the rural 
vote, they also succeeded in winning seats in the urban districts of Kathmandu 
and Lalitpur where elections were have said to be free and fair. Additionally, the 
Maoists took many votes away from Nepali Congress Party and gained majorities 
in districts previously devoted to the CPN-UML (Communist Party of Nepal-
United Marxist Leninist) (Lawoti 2010). The population‘s realization of their 
need for change and better services was not necessarily only measured by 
Maoists gains, but also by the votes received by the Madhesi and indigenous 
nationalities‘ who were also fighting for socio-economic equality and political 
change (Lawoti 2010).  
 The seriousness of the Maoists in their goals to empower the Dalits and 
women was made very clear when they presented the most inclusive list for the 
First Past the Post (FPTP) elections consisting of Dalits, indigenous nationalities, 
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Madhesi, women and youth candidates (Lawoti 2010). This kind of activity 
exemplifies the progressive nature of Maoists and their intentions to empower 
marginalized populations and can easily be considered a form of social 
development. ―The Maoist win was also helped by their liberal promises. They 
promised different things to different groups facing discrimination and inequality. 
In a society of severe inequality and scarcity, hope and promises may have been 
better than no promises or hope‖ (Lawoti 2010).  
 
Discussion/Analysis 
The Dichotomies between Development and Destruction, Growth and 
Decline  
 
We have said that ultimately the process of destruction is not only the 
process of destruction; it is also the process of construction. Without 
destruction there will not be construction…Like Mao said, people usually 
think that war is very destructive, war is very bad, it kills people, all these 
things. But people do not understand that war is a great process of 
construction. War has a very big cleansing effect. We also try to teach the 
people and train the cadres to understand this (Prachanda 1999). 
 
The past 15 years of Maoist political history sparks many debates on their 
intentions and their success and raises several ideological issues. Given my 
research findings, I think it is clear that the Maoist actions before, during and 
after the People‘s War can be understood through two distinct dichotomies. The 
first is between development and destruction. As it has been reiterated several 
times throughout the course of this paper, the Maoists have been very adamant 
about the need for development in Nepal. They have used development as a 
strategic way to recruit followers and have used it as the foundation of their 
political campaigns. In a 1999 interview, former Maoist Prime Minister, Puspa 
Kamal Dahal (a.k.a. Prachanda) spoke about the need for socialism in bringing 
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Nepal out of its immobile stage of underdevelopment. He said, ―More than 72% 
of the Nepalese people live below the poverty line. This is a grave situation. We 
have always explained to the people that nothing can be achieved from this multi-
party system—that it is fake, it is imperialist, it is feudal‖ (Prachanda 1999). This 
point was reiterated to me by Kul Prasad KC, (more commonly referred to as 
‗Sonam‘) a politburo member and leader of the Young Communist League 
(YCL), during an interview when he strongly emphasized that one-party and 
multi-party systems cannot solve problems of society. Only socialist systems 
contain the respect and cooperation that is needed to initiate social change. 
However, despite promises of a new state and an end to social inequality, very 
little reform was carried out while the Maoists were in power for nine months and 
very little is being accomplished presently. Additionally, it can be argued that 
very few improvements were made to the amount of people living below the 
poverty line and to the provision of basic services for these people. 
Social services were drastically affected by the escalation of the People‘s 
War and its subsequent destruction of infrastructure in the 1990s. Because of an 
increase in defense spending by the government, fewer funds were available for 
investment in the social sector. By July 2003, the Maoists were responsible for 
the destruction 1,683 (43%) of Village Development Committee office buildings 
as well as many police posts, airports, electricity power stations and substations, 
telecommunication towers and bridges (Lawoti and Pahari 2010). Schools were 
vandalized and forced to close and the threat of violence and general strikes 
frightened away many INGO and NGO development programs in rural areas 
occupied by the Maoists. This blatant attack on Nepal‘s infrastructure and 
development activities exemplifies a dichotomous relationship between the 
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Maoist dialogue of development and the reality of their destructive actions. In a 
sense, the People‘s War actually pushed Nepal further backwards into a state of 
severe underdevelopment and conflict. According to the above quote from 
Prachanda, destruction is a necessary precondition of development. However, the 
failure of the Maoists to enact any kind of social and economic change since their 
integration into the formal government is a key factor that has been emphasized 
and reiterated by a multitude of academics, intellectuals and the general 
population. The Maoists ―shook the foundation of Nepal but haven‘t provided 
any solutions,‖ says Janardan Sharma; ―Rural development discourse has been 
romanticized by the Maoists…they haven‘t delivered‖ says Hari Sharma of the 
Social Science Baha; ―After destruction, what is next? Reconstruction. This is not 
happening in Nepal. We need a peace process first,‖ says Krishna Bhattachan. 
The sentiments expressed by these renowned scholars are typical of the 
frustration felt by many with the failure of the Maoists to live up to their promise 
to bring about significant socio-economic change, spur development and improve 
living conditions. They demonstrate the intricate relationship between 
development and destruction in Nepal as a result of the Maoist presence.  
The other dichotomy that can be derived from my research findings is 
between growth and decline. The primary goal of the People‘s War was to bring 
about economic transformation which was also how the insurgency was able to 
gain so much momentum. However, the impact on Nepal‘s economy has been 
undeniably negative and has actually stunted economic growth in Nepal. Between 
1987-88 to 1994-95, GDP growth was 4.1%, between 1995-2000 it was at 5% 
(we can speculate that this is a result from the mobilization of the population 
during this time), but when the struggle escalated in 2001-2, GDP growth 
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declined to 2.7% (Lawoti and Pahari 2010). Lawoti and Pahari (2010) attribute 
this decline to the occurrence of several factors resulting from the People‘s War. 
Firstly, tourism declined more than 43% (Perry 2005) during the war as a result 
of political insecurity and negative publicity; there was disinvestment in the 
manufacturing and service sectors because of lack of law and order as well as 
closures and extortions by the insurgents. The Maoists did not pay off their credit 
for goods taken from the hill regions and thus the capital of many small traders 
dried up and food security was threatened,  many banks were looted and 
industries destroyed (Lawoti and Pahari 2010) and the economy was 
subsequently collapsing as exports and foreign aid were cancelled (Perry 2005). 
―In a country where the average person scrapes by on an income of $240 a year, 
many have fled to brothels in Bombay, sweatshops in Southeast Asia and 
servants‘ quarters in the Gulf: trade unions say 7 million out of 27 million 
Nepalis now live abroad‖ (Perry 2005). As the Maoists continued their 
campaigns with the intention of bringing the population out of a state of 
underdevelopment and misery, the economy in fact declined as a direct result of 
their actions. Again, although Prachanda claimed that destruction and therefore 
decline were necessary to development and growth, the majority of Nepal still 
remains in a state of extreme poverty showing no signs of economic 
improvement, especially with the current stalemate in the Constituent Assembly. 
―It‘s almost impossible to fathom what a poorer Nepal would be like, [but] I 
guess you move from disease to epidemic, and malnutrition to starvation. The 
best possible scenario is that one of the world‘s poorest countries just gets 
poorer‖ says the Human Rights Watch Deputy Director for Asia, Sam Zarifi in an 
interview with Time magazine (Perry 2005). 
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The dichotomy between destruction and development and growth and 
decline are extremely relevant to the ongoing development discourse in Nepal 
and essential to understanding my research findings. The present political 
situation has ultimately driven Nepal into a state of stunted development and 
distorted economic growth. I believe it is essential to address these dichotomies 
in discussing the future potential of development in Nepal, especially if the 
Maoists are to remain a majority in the Constituent Assembly. If development is 
to remain a serious goal of the Nepali government and the CPN-M, these issues 
of destruction and decline must be recognized. ―It is crucial to remember that 
political mobilization does not automatically translate into economic and resource 
mobilization. While the CPN-M and others inspired by its success have 
mobilized sizeable masses and stirred their aspirations, the profile of economic 
assets and possibilities in Nepal remains unchanged‖ (Lawoti and Pahari 2010). 
 
Conclusion 
Stacy Pigg (1992) says, ―Everyone‘s tomorrow will (or should) look like 
some people‘s present.‖ It is this mentality that has spurred so much conflict 
within the confines of Nepali politics. The need for development in Nepal is 
made clear by the extreme living conditions of the majority population and 
Nepal‘s international ranking as one of the poorest countries in the world. After 
the political change of 1990, the Nepali people reached a point of complete 
frustration and disillusionment with the government and its failure to take action 
against the social and economic inequality experienced by so many. Thus, the 
formation of the CPN-M political party occurred at a crucial stage of Nepali 
political history. The Maoists made clear their intentions to bring about social and 
Shornstein 27 
 
economic transformation by destroying the feudalistic systems and replacing 
them with a new people‘s democracy. During the mid-1990s, the Maoists 
succeeded in mobilizing thousands of people who were disenfranchised from the 
political process and eager to engage in activities that would improve their 
livelihoods. The Maoist promises of development were contradictory in that 
throughout the 10 years of the People‘s War, the Maoists were responsible for the 
destruction of infrastructure, the stalled development process, and the further 
demise of Nepal‘s economy. The years of violence that ensued contributed 
greatly to the current state of the Nepali political situation—that of complete 
dysfunction and deadlock. However, it was ultimately the promise and desire for 
development, a transition from the traditional to the modern that ignited the flame 
of the Maoist movement and secured the future of a Maoist political presence in 
Nepal. The incongruous relationship between what the Maoists said and what 
they did has precipitated a situation in which once again, the people are frustrated 
and disillusioned with the political process. Nepal‘s path towards development 
has ultimately been hindered by the actions of the Maoists, despite their noble 
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